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PART I. TRADE AND REGIONAL COORDINATION
TRADE BETWEEN THE ANDEAN GROUP'S
CARIBBEAN BASIN COUNTRIES AND
THE UNITED STATES
Dale Beck Furnish*
INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to discuss the Caribbean Basin from the standpoint of
its Andean Pact members. After all, the Andean Pact is a subregional
commitment which initially excludes the Caribbean and the trading
partners - present and potential - who front on it. I must be forgiven for
discussing the Andean Group's two Caribbean states - Colombia and
Venezuela - in a context removed from balmy beaches to the harsher
realities of the Andean highlands. The two countries' major commitment
to long-term trade lies there.
In a larger context, however, the Andean Group's problems and
concerns are linked to those of the Caribbean. They share a general hope
that a new economic order will result in greater equity and justice
through international trade. Specifically, both the Andean Group and the
Caribbean Basin countries want economies which will provide general
access to the more comfortable standard of living enjoyed by the bulk of
United States residents.' The United States, as the most powerful trading
nation on the international markets 2 and traditionally, the dominant
trading partner for most of the Caribbean and Latin American nations, is
a natural focus for these aspirations to change. To change an existing
order will certainly affect relations between the participants in that order.
The United States inevitably will be affected by commercial events and
* Professor, Arizona State University. At the time this paper was presented,
Professor Furnish was a Visiting Professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign College of Law.
1. There are any number of current expressions of the goals of the developing
countries. See, e.g., Acuerdo de Cartagena, Arts. 1-2, in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 910
(1968); U.N. CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES, art. 7 and passim, 14
INT'L LEGAL MATS. 251 (1974).
2. Combined export-import trade of the United States expanded from $35
billion in 1960 to $240 billion in 1976, with 1978 projections over $300 billion. GIST,
U.S. DEP'T. OF ST., U.S. TRADE POLICY (Feb. 1978). No other individual country
exceeds these figures, although the European Community does, apparently
counting intra-community exchange.
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policies in the Caribbean in the near future, whether they reflect regional
phenomena or a Third World movement. Our question here is not whether
there will be an effect, but what the effect will be.
THE ANDEAN GROUP - ITS GoALs AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS
The Andean Group involves Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Bolivia in a program of economic development set out in the Andean Pact
of 1969. 3 I use the term "economic development" instead of "economic
integration" advisedly, because although the Andean Group aims at
economic integration of its five member states, it does so principally as a
means to the end of development. 4 Before any meaningful consideration
of the Andean Group is possible, one must grasp the quintessential
objective of its Andean Pact: industrial development of all of its
constituent members up to a level at which all of its residents should be
able to enjoy the social and economic benefits available in a modern
industrialized society.5 The Andean Group is correctly denominated a
subregion, for it had to be conceived within the framework of LAFTA6 to
which all of its members first belonged. However, the Andean Pact
represents a program well beyond anything possible under LAFTA's
treaty of 1960. The Andean Pact is a reactive program drafted in light of
the Andean members' dissatisfiaction with LAFTA's failure and
continuing inability to foster development within the Andean Group
economies.7
The five contiguous countries which curl along the western coast of
South America from Venezuela to Bolivia wish nothing less from their
integration than to achieve a place in the international economy as an
3. See supra note 1.
4. "In 1969, when the Acuerdo de Cartagena was signed, the Andean
countries opted for a way of confronting the developmental challenge .... Within
a difficult economic period, such as that experienced by the world in recent years,
the advances registered by the Andean group . . . have confirmed the viability of
the integration scheme as a means to confront and resolve the problems of Andean
development." Prologue, Mecanismos de la Integraci6n Andina 3 (Lima, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Mecanismos] (author's translation). This is a brief publication
by the Andean Group Junta which gives a resume' of the Andean Group to date,
but the developmental preoccupation is not new. See Declaration of Bogota of 1966,
the initial statement of intentions by the Andean Group organizers.
5. The term usually applied is "balanced and harmonious development"
(desarrollo equilibrado y harmonizado).
6. See LAFTA Permanent Executive Committee Res. 165, 179; LAF'A Conf.
Res. 202, 203 (CH-II/VI-E) and 22 (VII).
7. See Furnish & Atkin, The Andean Group's Program for Industrial
Development of the Metalworking Sector, 7 LAW. AM. 29, 31-32 (1975) [hereinafter
Furnish & Atkin].
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exporter of manufactured goods.8 The Andean Pact is perhaps the most
profound expression of the belief that attainment of such status will bring
with it social justice for the seventy million inhabitants of the Andean
Group. There were benefits to the member states under LAIFTA and these
benefits still exist as total intra-LAFTA trade continues to increase in
both absolute and percentage terms for all Andean countries. The Andean
Group nations did not form their new pact because LAFTA had a
negative impact on their trade statistics, but because it fell short of
meeting their painfully-felt developmental necessities. The Andean Pact
- and the fact of its continuing existence in spite of considerable
difficulties - stands for the commitment and overriding concern of its
signatories for economic and social development.
The Andean Group has achieved several noteworthy things to date.
Perhaps the most significant in the eyes of the world has been its
Decision 24 of 1970, the well-known Andean Foreign Investment Code.9
Yet, Decision 24 and other subregional legislation are not so important to
the Andean Group as its sectorial programs of industrial development
(SPID).10 Three SPID have been promulgated so far; one for machine tools
in 1973,11 for petrochemicals in 197512 and automobiles in 1977.13 There
must be several more SPID in the next few years if the Andean Group is
to continue as a viable effort at integration. 14
The SPID are programs of industrial planning and rationalization on
a subregional scale. They treat key sectors by identifying their component
production areas and then assigning them, often exclusively and
sometimes jointly, for development within specific members of the
Andean Group. Assignment of a given product carries with it exclusive
duty-free access to all markets within the subregion. Of course, no SPID
industries should be able to prosper solely on the economies of scale
possible with a population base of seventy million as their primary
market. Initially protected by a common outer tariff, SPID industries
should become internationally competitive over time.
15
8. See Mecanismos, supra note 4, at 33-34 (1977); Heldt, Integraci6n Regional
en America Latina, INTEGRACI6N LATINAMERICANA, at 19 (March 1977).
9. See updated version in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 138 (1977).
10. See, Furnish & Atkin, supra note 7, at 35-37.
11. Decision 57 of 20 August 1972.
12. Decision 91 of 29 August 1975.
13. Decision 120 of 13 September 1977.
14. Currently under consideration are proposals for sectorial programs in
chemicals, steel, pharmaceuticals, electronics, pulp and paper, and telecommunica-
tions.
15. Furnish & Atkin, supra note 7, at 46.
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One might entertain doubts about the viability of the Andean Group.
Since this analysis will proceed on the assumption that the Andean
integration effort is effective and vigorous, perhaps some proof should be
offered at this early stage. After all, integration movements in Latin
America have a tradition of starting bravely but floundering in their first
decade when their structural weaknesses are exposed by the hard facts of
politics. It is significant that the Andean Group is close to its tenth year
and has successfully negotiated a crisis which might have consigned the
program to the same comatose state currently afflicting the CACM and
LAFTA, both of which have been engaged in the official reorganization
of their programs since 1969, the year the Andean Pact was signed. In the
last year, Chile, initiator of the Andean integration idea, withdrew from
the Pact in a dispute on fundamental policy.16 The year was a watershed
in that a new Junta assumed office and many of the original andeacrats
who had drafted the fundamentals of the Andean program left Junta
headquarters in Lima to be replaced by a new generation. World economic
problems pushed inflation and held back exports in the subregion. It was
a time in which it would have been easy for a vulnerable movement to
have settled softly into the lethargic innocuousness of LAFTA - efficient
and conscientious, yet unaggressive and virtually devoid of political
initiative - but instead two new sectorial programs were pushed through,
and Chile's secession seemed to unite the remaining five and sharpen
their commitment.
If the Andean Group achieves its objectives, there should be an initial
and increasing trade diversion away from the United States and other
traditional import sources for manufactured goods in favor of growing
intra-Andean exchange. Historically, the United States has accounted for
close to one-half of all the foreign trade (imports and exports) for
Venezuela and Colombia. There is some evidence in the trade statistics
that the status quo is shifting. By picking out benchmark dates within
the Latin American integration process, one can detect a definite impact:
there is greater exchange among Andean Group (and -other Latin
American) trading partners combined with a relative decline in trade
with the United States. 7
The character of the Andean Group and its member states'
international trade is not developing in a vacuum. Though some may still
view Latin America as a fractious area in which agreement on trade and
development matters is a rare event, solidarity of viewpoint is growing
16. See 9 LAw. AM. 179 (1977).
17. Evoluci6n Favorable del Comercio Dentro del Grupo Andino, GRuPO
ANDINO, No. 70 at 15 (Nov. 1977).
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remarkable in comparison to the situation as recently as a decade ago.
The "New Economic Order" so much bruited about in the United Nations
has had a positive effect throughout the Third World, even though it has
not resulted in any concrete and enforceable international legislation.18
The communication among Southern Hemisphere countries on common
problems of development is intense. Within the Andean Group, there is
constant reinforcement of integration by discovery of new and beneficial
occasions for cooperation. 19 Likewise, there are numerous points of shared
concern between the Andean Group countries and the developing nations
of the Caribbean Basin. The United States should be aware that when the
have-nots consort, much of their discussion will focus on how to secure
more advantageous relations with the haves. Incipient clout, gained with
solidarity of demand and through realization of the strategic importance
of their raw materials, is bringing the Third World and Latin America
close to the day when they can drive demanding bargains with the
"North" or industrially developed nations.
The advent of SELA should be viewed as strengthening and
coordinating the bargaining power of the entire region at the same time it
buoys up the integration process. With headquarters in Caracas, SELA
can be viewed as, at least partially, a forum for Venezuelan economic
policy even though the organization is staffed from all of Latin America.
Thus far SELA seems a serious effort that is winning adherents over time
despite its rather flexible objectives and its ambitious program. 20 Perhaps
the most important point to be made concerning SELA is that it
demonstrates the ability of Latin American countries to cooperate and
maintain communications on international economic questions; that is,
the times have changed so that something concrete can be done through
such a structure. A few years ago, nothing beyond the most general
expressions of good intentions would likely have issued and it is unlikely
that so many countries would have joined. Today, it is a genuine Latin
American forum, as distinguished from the more academic approach of
the United Nations' ECLA.
18. On the national level the new economic order is very much in evidence,
witnessed by the proliferation of new laws on foreign investment and transfer of
technology throughout Latin America in the last decade.
19. See, e.g., the Venezuelan Fund established for the Inter-American Bank, 14
INT'L LEGAL MATS. 315 (1975); or view any issue of GRUPO ANDINO passim for
cooperation among Andean Group countries or between the subregion and foreign
countries and agencies.
20. See generallythe SELA Convention in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1081 (1976);
SELA Council Decision on Rules of Procedure for Action Committees, 15 INT'L
LEGAL MATS. 1118 (1976); and SELA Council Decision on Work Program, 15 INT'L
LEGAL MATS. 1125 (1976).
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Regardless of my emphasis on the multilateral commitments of
Colombia and Venezuela, no entangling trade alliance can stand unless it
ultimately serves the perceived best interests of a given participant. If
sufficient incentive can be created, either Colombia or Venezuela should
be quick to break from solidarity and attend to its own best advantage.
This has frequently occurred in Latin America in the case of individual
countries. Let us then demonstrate why the Andean Group's Caribbean-
Basin countries will find their greatest advantage in honoring their group
commitments over any attempt at unilateral conduct.
VENEZUELA
Venezuela's petroleum resources make it unique among Latin
American countries. Not only do petroleum exports account for the
country's national surplus in foreign exchange, but they are so
appreciable as to make the overall balance of payments between Latin
America and the United States look respectable where it otherwise would
not.21 As a net exporter, Venezuela had misgivings about joining the
Andean Group and in fact delayed its adherence to the Andean Pact for
four years, finally joining in 1973. This was an accurate perception of the
sacrifice it was called upon to make: it had to contemplate turning its
foreign exchange earnings away from the importation of manufactured
goods from the United States and other exporters with the highest
technological skill and quality so as to make a commitment to take
manufactured goods from other Andean Group countries as industry
strengthened within the subregion.22 This meant a commitment to pay at
least sometimes higher prices for lesser goods, only during the short run.
An indication of the restructuring of its foreign trade which
Venezuela carried out prior to joining the Andean Group is its
termination of a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States
originally signed in 1939.23 In essense, the reciprocal agreement
encouraged the export of Venezuelan petroleum to the United States with
a corresponding flow of U.S. capital and durable goods to Venezuela, all
at preferential tariff rates. The agreement apparently had the effect of
forging an effective link between the two countries. This relationship
stabilized Venezuelan currency against the dollar, and per capita income
21. For example, LAFrA countries ran a $5.5 billion trading deficit with the
United States in 1975, a year in which Venezuela exported $3.6 billion (largely in
petroleum and products) of LAFTA's total $8.1 billion exports to the United States.
22. See generally, GRUPO ANDINO, No. 38 (Feb. 1973).
23. 203 L.N.T.S. 274 (1940-41); supplemented by 3 U.S.T. 4195 (1952); clarified
by 14 U.S.T. 1901 (1963); terminated by 23 U.S.T. 1213 (1972).
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in Venezuela grew to be the highest in Latin America, but labor costs in
the country were, as now, proportionately high. Although the United
States has consistently run a trade deficit with Venezuela in recent years,
its exports to that country were quite substantial in absolute terms:
American dollars, spent to purchase Venezuelan petroleum, returned to
the United States in the form of Venezuelan payment for extensive
imports of U.S. manufactures. This basic trade relation continues
(according to the most recent figures at my disposal), despite the fact that
Venezuela and the United States terminated the reciprocal trade
agreement in June 1972, apparently preparatory to Venezuela's entry into
the Andean Group.
What is impressive about Venezuela's trade figures through 1975 is
that they demonstrate a notable upsurge in LAFIA and Andean Group
trade, although percentages remain low for these trading partners. For
purposes of our consideration here, one should presume that Venezuela
will continue to trade large amounts of petroleum to the United States
and reciprocate by taking large amounts of manufactured items in return,
but the liaison is neither so firm nor so committed as it was before the
termination of the trade agreement which had stood for thirty-three
years. Much of the increase in Venezuela's exports may be explained by
the increase in the price of oil due to OPEC so that the 100% increase in
Venezuela's LAFTA exports is not surprising between 1966 and 1975.
However, during the same period, Venezuela's LAFTA imports increased
by over 1000%, from $31.7 billion to $354.3 billion, with over half the
increase occurring after 1973 when the Andean Group impact should
have manifested itself.
This is most significant, for if Venezuela's oil production is
segregated from consideration, the country is very underdeveloped. It
does not have strong advancement in its industrial manufacturing
sectors and it has been amply demonstrated that exceptional exploitation
of mineral wealth cannot bring about the sort of overall distribution of
wealth and standard of living necessary to stabilize the country.
Apparently aware of its vulnerability behind the shield of its oil riches,
Venezuela's decision to join the Andean Group is a decision to bring
about industrial, economic and social change in a way which could not
occur if it did not make itself this sort of hostage to the fortunes of the
Andean Pact.24 To date, Venezuela has been a strong participant in the
Andean Group. As the country points out, it commits more of its national
budget to foreign aid than the United States and it has been a leader in
24. Interview with Dr. Manuel Perez-Guerrero, Venezuelan Minister of
International Economic Affairs, LE MONDE (May 8, 1977).
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fomenting SELA and other institutions and arrangements to further the
developmental cause in this hemisphere.
COLOMBIA
Colombia contrasts sharply with Venezuela. It is a representative
Andean Group member with no major-magnitude export and a chronic
shortfall in its foreign exchange earnings. Colombia's major exports tend
to lie in the agricultural sector (cotton, sugar, coffee) and have been
boosted in recent years by international scarcity. The country's major
trading partner has traditionally been the United States which, until
more recently, had accounted for almost one-half of Colombia's exports
and imports each year. Unlike Venezuela, Colombia has a vigrorously
expanding domestic industrial sector.
Colombia's industrial products cannot compete in international
markets with those of the developed countries, but recent trends in
Colombian foreign trade indicate that they are becoming a significant
element in the country's exports through their access to Andean Group
and LAFTA markets. It is generally true that while exports to the U.S.
have been of agricultural and primary materials, exports to other Latin
American trading partners have been of industrial products. Since both
imports and exports from the United States have increased steadily in
absolute terms while accounting for a steadily decreasing percentage of
Colombia's trade, it is apparent that Colombia is increasing its industrial
exchange within the Latin American region in general and the Andean
Group in particular. Especially interesting in the context of our
Caribbean Basin discussion is the fact that Colombia has sought out
Venezuela as a special trading partner and has increased its exports from
$2.7 million in 1966 to $89.5 million in 1975, a singularly impressive
trend.
Colombia seems to derive the requisite benefits from the subregional
integration program even though it has displayed skepticism of the
Andean Group on frequent occasions.2 5 The amendments to the Andean
Code on Foreign Investments, which recently increased the maximum
profits subject to repatriation to twenty percent and the maximum profits
subject to reinvestment in the host country to seven percent, may have
allayed Colombia's main doubts concerning Andean integration. Its trade
figures are a classic profile of what should happen to an Andean Group
country as a result of the integration process. Its LAFIA exports have
increased eight-fold since 1966, with the most dramatic jump occurring in
25. See 8 LAw. AM. 834-35 (1976).
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the period between the instigation of the Andean Group's initial free-trade
regulations on internal items in 1973 and in 1975 when LAFTA expprts
more than doubled. In other words, Colombia is beginning its steps
toward significant export of manufactured goods and the sort of
industrial economy which will support a "developed" society. This would
be a radical change in the socioeconomic makeup of Colombia, but the
first glimmerings are there in the trade figures.
If the glimmerings become a dawning, we can expect to see Colombia
continue to increase its exports to the United States but not at the rate
with which it increases nontraditional exports to other Andean Group
countries with other Latin American countries following, and perhaps
ultimately, as a competitive producer on the world market, breaking into
nontraditional markets as demand dictates. This eventuality should be
cause for some alarm in the United States, not because it need be to the
latter's detriment but because it may catch the U.S. by surprise if this
country does not understand the phenomenon.
UNITED STATES
U.S. trade with Colombia is of doubtful importance, either in an
absolute sense or strategically, although the U.S. has quite clearly been
the major trading partner of both Colombia and Venezuela since World
War II. On the other hand, the United States must certainly view
Venezuela as an important source of an essential import. Even if
Venezuela were not an oil exporter to the United States, it would probably
be considered an important country to the United States for the high
amount of U.S. exports it absorbs - $2.8 billion in 1975. Regardless of the
obvious distinctions between Venezuela and Colombia, when the two are
compared as individual trading partners of the United States, these two
members of the Andean Group cannot be separated so easily as to say one
is important and the other is not. Colombia cannot be viewed as an
isolated nation-state and dismissed on that basis; its fortunes ultimately
become at least partially those of Venezuela and vice versa, because they
are linked in a common cause.
The United States has defined its trade policy for the new economic
order of the 1970s with the passage of the Trade Act of 1974.26 While the
new law has some benefits and represents an advance over prior existing
legislation controlling trade relations with Latin America, it has not been
warmly received in this hemisphere. The reasons are simple. In the eyes
of Latin beholders, the Trade Act could only be viewed as a U.S. response
26. 19 U.S.C. §§2101 et seq (1974).
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to the demands of the Third World for a new international economic
order. As such, it falls short of well-defined interests and demands of the
developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere. In addition, it rubs
salt in old sores of U.S.-Latin American relations. The Trade Act pales in
comparison with the concessions that African, Caribbean and Pacific
states were able to negotiate with the European Economic Community in
the Treaty of Lom6. 27 Galling to Latins is the GSP it contains, which has
many strings attached 28 and is only a ten-year program with an
evaluation report due at midterm. All in all, the Trade Act of 1974 is a
tentative document. It is a wary partial response to Third World
demands, burdened with old skeletons like the Hickenlooper Amendment
and other mechanisms from a different era in trade relations.
An illustration of the lack of a U.S. legislative response to Third World
demands is the $20 million ceiling on imports of any one item from a
27. See Laing, New Departures in Multilateral Trade, Development and
Cooperation; The Lomk Convention and its Impact on the United States, 27
MERCER L. REV. 781 (1976).
28. The Congress felt it necessary to limit United States GSP participation to
those "beneficiary" countries which do not expropriate or nationalize without
paying prompt, adequate and effective compensation or beginning good faith
negotiations to establish such compensation. Although an executive override is
possible whenever "the President determines that [beneficiary] designation shall
be in the national economic interest of the United States," the fact that such
criteria might be invoked against inclusion in the GSP runs counter to the
demands of the Third World in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties which
does not recognize the "fair, adequate and effective" standard of compensation and
against current confirmed effective practice in negotiating the settlement of
expropriations in Latin America. See Gantz, The Marcona Settlement: New Forms
of Negotiation and Compensation for Nationalized Property, 71 AM. J. INT'L. L.
474 (1977). There is a clear prohibition against allowing beneficiary-country status
for any country which belongs to OPEC or similar commodity cartels. This
provision cost Venezuela (and Ecuador) exclusion in the list of beneficiary states
which might utilize the GSP for their exports. Arguably, Venezuela and Ecuador
could still be included on the list of beneficiary states for GSP, if the Chief
Executive were willing to determine that OPEC's activity did not "cause serious
disruption of the world economy." Venezuela never participated in the embargo so
as to "withhold supplies of vital commodity resources from international trade."
See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2) (1965).
The Latin Americans are not satisfied with the Trade Act's version of the
GSP aside from the constraints on beneficiary status. Protectionist sentiment is
apparent in the insulation of "import-sensitive" articles (those which would
compete favorably in price with current production of the same article within the
United States) from the GSP list of approved articles. If internal production should
cover demand, then the item is import-sensitive to the extent that imports under
the GSP might curtail national production, i.e., compete successfully in price with
the U.S. product.
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beneficiary GSP country.29 In effect, this may act as a disincentive to
beneficiary countries to increase export production. Similarly, the
limitation imposed on each beneficiary country of fifty percent of the total
annual U.S. imports of any given article3° operates against specialization
and comparative advantage in some countries as well as serves to
discourage increased production.
Another aspect of the Trade Act (and one which illustrates the
solidarity of the Andean Group), is that if a country such as Colombia is
prevented from developing a world-competitive scale in its production of a
given item or line of items then the entire Andean Group may be similarly
frustrated. Why? Because the subregion often will have designated a
single country like Colombia as its member state to develop that industry
within one of the sectorial programs of industrial development. In the
name of efficiency, the Andean Group puts all of its industrialization eggs
in one national basket (Colombia, in our example). At the same time, the
Trade Act insists on spreading the benefits among several countries by
imposing dollar limits on the amount of exports of a given item any
country can ship to the United States. A more appropriate way to handle
the subregional integration phenomenon would be to assign Colombia
five maximum-dollar quotas, or one for each of the Andean Group
members, in light of their common cause.
Both the quantitative limit and the fifty percent maximum may be
avoided by the President where there is a traditional trade relationship
treaty or trade agreement with the country in question and the country
does not impose discriminatory, "unjustifiable or unreasonable barriers"
against U.S. commerce. 31 Wholly apart from the discretionary aspects of
such exemption, the respect for traditional preferences must frustrate
countries who would foment development by using the GSP as a means of
breaking existing trade patterns.
The United States need not give Latin America any special breaks, of
course, and must attend to its own concerns as it attempts to aid by
opening its market to Third World producers. However, the Trade Act of
1974 should be seen for what it is: legislation unable to satisfy many of
the long-term concerns and interests of Colombia for its industrial
development and failing to open its benefits to Venezuela which, in all
likelihood, is not in a position to take significant advantage of GSP
29. 19 U.S.C. § 2464(cXl)(A) (1965). There is a provision for upward-adjustment
of the $25M figure, based on increases in the United States' GNP.
30. 19 U.S.C. § 2464(cX1XB).
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(1)(B)(i-iii).
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access anyway. Thus, the Act should have no major effect on defining
new trade patterns even though it is drafted for an era of great movement
and redefinition of trade patterns.
FUTURE EFFECTS OF THE ANDEAN GROUP INTEGRATION ON
TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES
The Andean Group can already point to an impressive increase in
intraregional trade and overall exports since its inception in 1969.32
During the six-year period, exports have increased from $5,541 million to
$16,470 million, or about 300%. During the same period, imports have
risen from $4,126 million to $12,537 million, or about a 300% increase.
Intraregional trade does not account for a large percentage of the trade,
currently standing at five percent of exports (up from three percent in
1969) and six percent of imports (up from four percent in 1969). When one
considers that even for subregional trade about fifty percent of exchange
is covered by three traditional products - meat, sugar and combustibles
- it might appear that the impact of the Andean Pact on existing
patterns has been minimal.
There are significant indications that an incipient transformation is
underway in the Andean Group. Whereas in 1969-70, only four percent of
the Andean Group's internal trade was in manufactured items, by
1975-76 those articles had risen to twenty percent of its trade. The
number of manufactured items in subregional trade grew from 171 in
1969 to 312 in 1976. However, one should not overestimate the stakes; in
1976, there were still only $275 million worth of manufactured items
exchanged within the subregion.
The Andean Group's major stock-taking occurred in October 1976 and
resulted in the Lima Protocol to the original Cartagena Agreement.33 The
discussion within the Group, which was one of serious discord and
resulted in the withdrawal of Chile from the Andean Pact, centered on the
elimination of customs duties on intraregional trade and the instigation
of the common external tariff. At first instance, the proposal was made to
delay the instigation of the common external tariff and the cessation of
all intraregional duties, and to readjust benefits by way of special
concessions to Boliva and Ecuador. The concerns of Colombia and Chile,
probably the two most industrially-advanced countries within the Group
32. All figures in the next two paragraphs are taken from Evoluci6n Favorable
del Comercio Dentro del Grupo Andino, GRUPo ANDINO No. 70 at 15 (Nov. 1977).
33. 16 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 235 (1977); See Acuerdo de Cartagena, Texto Oficial
Codificado, GRuPO ANDINO, Separata No. 42 (May 1977), incorporating the
changes into the Andean Pact.
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at that time, were that they were the most dependent upon the tariff-
reform programs for continuing expansion of their industrial sectors.
They felt that the delay, caused by the slow implementation of the new
tariff policies, would create inefficient industries with which the Andean
Group would then be saddled. This would be a permanent detrimeit to
world-competitive industrialization and the ultimate development of the
Group.34 Against these arguments, Ecuador and others stated that the
central principle of balanced, harmonious development necessitated
special concern for the plight of the less-developed countries of the region,
who would be cast into permanent disadvantage if Colombia and Chile
were allowed to increase their original headstart in industrialization. 35
Venezuela and Peru sided with Bolivia and Ecuador, Chile dropped out
and Colombia was apparently placated by liberalizing modifications in
the Andean Foreign Investment Code. 36 The Andean Group as a whole
appears strengthened in solidarity, although it now remains to be seen
whether the subregional integration effort can in fact bring about
efficiency and world-competitive industrialization at the same time it
serves the objectives of balanced development, i.e., whether "harmonious"
development is inevitably doomed to inefficiency. Only time can tell, but
the experiment is noble and perhaps dictated by the hard fact that no
other means of development is available for countries like Bolivia and
Ecuador.
CONCLUSIONS
The United States, through its official voices, has recently empha-
sized its dependency on the international market and its commitment to
free trade. At the same time it recognizes the legitimacy of the demands
made by the less-developed countries and reiterates its willingness to
participate in the North-South dialogue. Its legislation, however, evinces
a lingering protectionism and something less than willingness to commit
itself to helping Latin American and other underdeveloped countries by
opening its market to their exports. This is not improper, for the U.S. is
concerned with assuring its sources of raw materials and getting
something in return for its concessions. Latin America, speaking from the
righteous position of the less-developed, wants to get a lot and give a
little. Much will be determined by relative bargaining power and Latin
America's bargaining power is growing rapidly along with that of the
34. See Andean Group Forced to Reevaluate Priorities, 8 LAW. AM. 832, 834
(1976).
35. Id. at 835.
36. See supra note 13.
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Third World in general. Colombia and Venezuela seem committed to the
Third World view at the present time, as confirmed by recent develop-
ments within the Andean Group.
If the Andean Group is able to maintain its momentum, its
bargaining power and its trading power will increase still more. It would
behoove the United States to consolidate its position with the Andean
Group against the eventuality of a strong Andean industrial complex
which will draw on Andean raw materials for its manufactures. This
would divert those materials from the United States while, at the same
time, import-substitution reduces U.S. exports to the subregion. Con-
cretely, the United States should open its market to greater imports from
the Andean Group and give all the support and aid the Andean Group
will permit, so that the Andean effort at integration will develop with the
United States as an involved observer. Unfortunately, current lines are
drawn against such a role until the United States demonstrates greater
amenability for the new international economic order in its positive laws
as well as its official statements. Currently a war of economic desires and
ideologies exists between the North and South, albeit some would classify
it as a dialogue.
